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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
In the Supreme Court of Ohio, -December Term, 1856.
THE MAD RIVER AND LAXE ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY Vs. ANSON C.
BARBER.
1. In an action against a railroad company, for an injury sustained by a person
while acting in the capacity of conductor on a train of cars, on the ground that
the injury was the result of the insufficiency of the cars, or defects in the machi-
nery of the train, the company is not to be treated as a guarantor qf the stffciency
and safely of the cars, and machinery of the train; but as responsible only where
the injury is without fault on the part of the conductor, and the result of the
neglect of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence in furnishing sufficient and
bafe cars and machinery for the train.
2. The conductor of a train of railway cars, although he undertakes his engage-
ment in view of the nature, hazards and responsibilities of his employment, has
reason to expect, and a right to exact that reasonable care and diligence on the part
of his employer, in furnishing him with safe and sufficient cars and machinery for
the train, which is most common and usual in the business of railroad compa-
nies; nud being presumed to contract in contemplation of this, he can require
no more.
3. The conductor of a train of railway cars, being the representative of the railroad
company in the command and management of the train, and not being under the
immediate control and direction of a superior or supervisory agent, is held to ordi-
nary and reasonable care and diligence, not only in the management of the train,
but also in the due inspection of the cars, machinery and apparatus of the train,
as to their sufficiency and safety; and if he receive an injury while neglecting
that care and diligence required of him in the management of his train, or by
means of any defect or insufficiency in the cars, machinery or apparatus, with a
knowledge of which he was running the train, or which could have been known
to him, by the exercise of that care and diligence required of him in the perform-
ance of his duty, or in other words, if his neglect in either of these particulars
contributed as a proximate cause of the injury, he can have no right of action
against the company for damages.
4. A railroad company is not liable to an action for damages for an injury received
by a conductor of one of its trains, in consequence of the insufficiency of the
cars, or defects in the machinery or apparatus of the train under his charge and
control, where such insufficiency or defects were unknown to both parties, and
neither party was in fault.
RAILROAD COMPANY vs. BARBER.
5. In such action, the plaintiff, in order to lay a sufficient foundation for a recovery
and jodgment, for an injury received by him while acting as such conductor, must
aver, or show in his petition, in addition to the allegation that he had not a
knowledge of the insufficiency or defects which were the alleged cause of the
injury, that he had exercised due care and diligence in the use and examination
or inspection of the cars, machinery, etc., belonging to the train, while the same
were in his charge, and under his direction.
6. It is the duty of a railway company to furnish the necessary and proper number
of hands for the safe management of its trains, and also to exercise due care and
diligence in furnishing sufficient and safe machinery; and for a delinquency in
either particular, the conductor of a train has a right to decline his charge, or
refuse to run the train. But where he takes the charge, and runs his train for a
length of time, without a sufficient number of hands, he voluntarily assumes the
risk, and waives the obligation of the company in this respect as to himself, and
if injured by means of such delinquency on the part of the company, he is with-
out a remedy against the company for damages.
This is a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District
Court of Seneca county.
In February, 1855, Barber filed a petition in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Seneca county, against the railroad company, in which
he alleges :
"That on the 28th day of December, A. D. 1852, be was in the
employ of said defendant, the said Mad River and Lake Erie Rail-
road Company, as the conductor of a freight train of cars running
between Sandusky city and Kenton, Ohio, on the track of said
defendant's road. That while he was so in the employ of said
defendant, and on the day and year aforesaid, the said defendant
placed under his charge a train of heavily loaded freight cars, and
requested him, as the servant of the said defendant, to conduct said
train by the defendant's said road to the town of Kenton, in the
county of Hardin, and State of Ohio ; and that, as the servant of
the defendant, he took charge of said train as the conductor of the
same for the purpose aforesaid. That said defendant failed and
neglected to provide said train with hands necessary to manage and
control the same upon the grades of said defendant's road. That said
defendant failed and neglected to furnish said cars in said train with
necessary brake rods, brake chains, brake rubbers, and other machi-
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nery to work said brakes, and make the rubbers thereof bear upon the
wheels oF the cars in said train. And the defendant failed and ne-
glected to furnish the cars in said train with suitable, proper, neces-
sary or safe platforms or places upon which to stand and work said
brakes. That said defendant failed and neglected to furnish neces-
sary, suitable, or safe connecting links for attaching the cars in said
train together. But on the contrary, the defendant caused the
plaintiff to take said train under his charge and conduct the same
to the said town of Kenton, without any person to assist him in
the working or management of the brakes and cars therein upon
the grades of said road. That the defendant wrongfully and
negligently furnished said train with a deficient amount of brake
rods, chains, rubbers, levers, and other machinery for braking
and controlling the motion of the cars in said train upon the
grades of defendant's said road. That the defendant wrongfully
and negligently provided for and furnished the cars in said train
with defective brake rods, and defective and broken and unsound
brake chains, and defective and unsafe levers and other machinery,
with which to work said brakes, and unsafe, dangerous and defec-
tive platforms upon said cars, whereon to stand when working said
brakes. That the defendant wrongfully and negligently provided
for and furnished the cars in said train with defective, unsound and
broken connecting links by which to attach the same together.
That he received the said train with all the defects and imperfec-
tions aforesaid in the cars, brakes, connecting links and other ma-
chinery, and that he was at the time he so received said train, and
continued wholly ignorant of said imperfections and defects, and
said defendant wholly failed and neglected to inform him thereof.
That he conducted said train in the conditions aforesaid to the said
town of Kenton, and he then caused said train to be moved upon a
heavy down grade for the purpose of having the same switched off
from the main track to a side track of said road, which was a
necessary and usual movement of said train at that point, and for
the purpose of enabling a train coming from the south upon the
main line of said road to pass the train under the charge of the
plaintiff as aforesaid. That as said train was started upon said
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grade, one of the connecting links so wrongfully and negligently
placed on said train broke, and permitted said train to part, and
three heavy eight-wheeled heavily loaded freight cars were thus
detached from the balance of the train, and being in the rear of
the balance of said train, commenced running down the said grade,
endangering the locomotive and other cars in said train. That in
order to prevent a collision among the cars in said train, he imme-
diately got on board of one of said detached cars, and placed him-
self upon the platform, and took hold of the lever on the top of the
brake-rod, and commenced winding up the brake-chain in order to
make the rubber bear upon the wheel of said car, and thereby check
the motion of the same with the other detached cars. That when
he was so winding up the brake-chain as aforesaid, the same sud-
denly, by means and in consequence of the defects therein, gave
way, and that said lever and brake-rod were in consequence of the
giving away aforesaid caused to whirl rapidly round, and throw
plaintiff from his balance and prevent him from holding his footing
on the defective platform or standing-place on said cars, and threw
plaintiff on the ground in front of the said cars, which were in
motion and passing down said grade. That in consequence of said
fall from said pltform to the ground, he was stunned and rendered
insensible, and said loaded cars passed over him, and by the fall
aforesaid and the passing of said cars over the plaintiff, he was
greatly injured, and had one of his knee-pans broken and his right
arm crushed, thereby causing him to be lame in one of his legs
through life, and rendering him lame in said right arm to such an
extent that he has lost the use of his right hand throughout his
whole life, and was rendered otherwise lame and unhealthy, and
unable to pursue any of the active or useful vocations of life. That
in consequence of the injuries aforesaid, he suffered great bodily
pain and anguish, and yet suffers pain and anguish, and that he is
disfigured and unable to make a living. That he incurred
said injuries in the proper and rightful discharge of his duty, and
in consequence of the neglect and wrongful acts of the defendant
aforesaid. That the said county of Seneca, in which the plaintiff
has brought this suit, is one of the counties in which defendant's
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said railroad is located. Wherefore the plaintiff asks judgment
against the defendant for the sum of forty thousand dollars," etc.
To this petition the defendant demurred, on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
court overruled this demurrer, and the defendant excepted, and on
leave filed an answer, averring:
"That, on the 28th day of December, A. D. 1852, the plaintiff
was, and for about nine months prior to that time, had been in the em-
ploy of the defendant, as the conductor of the train of cars in the peti-
tion mentioned, for which, so long as he continued to serve the de-
fendant as such conductor, the defendant agreed to pay him at the
rate of one dollar and sixty cents per day. That the contract be-
tween it and the plaintiff, under which the plaintiff was to and did
render said services, was for no determinate period of time, but the
defendant had the right, at any time, to discharge the plaintiff, and
he had, at any time, a right to leave the service of defendant. That
from the time he was so employed up to the time said accident hap-
pened, the plaintiff continuously had charge of said train as its con-
ductor, and the defendant denies that on said 28th day of Decem-
ber, A. D. 1852, it did anything specially towards putting said"
train under the charge of the plaintiff, or that it gave him any
special directions in relation thereto; but the plaintiff took said train
in the ordinary course of his business, and because he was its con-
ductor as aforesaid. Defendant denies that it failed on its part to
provide men sufficient to run and manage said train, or that it failed
to provide for the use thereof suitable connecting-links, brakes,
brake-chains, or levers or platforms, or that it furnished cars for
said train having any of the defects in said petition mentioned, which
it could, by ordinary care and diligence on its part, except as that
care and diligence was exercised through and by means of the
plaintiff, as such conductor, have detected or avoided. That said
train of cars, while the plaintiff was so the conductor thereof, was
under his management and control; that it was his duty to see that
all the other employees of the defendant attached to said train per-
formed their duty; that it was his duty to run, manage and control
said train in the most careful and prudent manner ; and it was his
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duty to keep, and see that said train was kept, at all times, under
proper and safe control, to do whatever was necessary to effect that
object; and it was especially his duty to ascertain and keep himself
at all times informed of the condition of the cars composing said
train, and of the connecting-links, brakes, chains, and all fixtures
and machinery connected therewith, and to see that no car was per-
mitted to run in said train which it was dangerous or unsafe so to
use, and to see that his said train, taken as a whole, had no defects
or deficiencies which rendered it unsafe to run the same upon the
defendant's road. That the plaintiff, on the said 28th day of De-
cember, A. D. 1852, before said accident happened, and at the time
he so engaged to become the conductor of said train, well under-
stood the hazard of that business, and well knew in all respects the
condition of defendant's road, and the character of its grades ; and
on said 28th day of December, A. D. 1852, and before said acci-
dent happened, the plaintiff well knew how many men were in actual
service on said train, and if said train, or the cars composing the
same, had on that day any of the defects or deficiencies in said pe-
tition mentioned, which by care and diligence he could have dis-
covered, it was gross negligence on his part that he did not discover
the same.
" That the negligence and want of care of the plaintiff in the
management of said train, before and at the time said accident hap-
pened, materially contributed to produce the injury of which he
complains."
The trial in the Common Pleas resulted in a verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff below, and the defendant appealed.
The case came on for trial to a jury in the district court at the
September term, 1855.
It appears, from the bill of exceptions taken in the district court,
that the testimony introduced on the part of plaintiff on the trial
tended to establish the following facts : The plaintiff went into the
employ of the defendant in the spring of the year 1852, and acted,
the greater part of the time he was so in defendants' employ, as the
conductor of a train of cars on defendant's road, and a part of the
time in other capacities. In the latter part of November, 1852, he
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became the conductor of a train of freight cars running between
Sandusky and Kenton. The defendant had two freight trains on
that route, and in the regular course of business they left Sandusky
on alternate days, at five o'clock in the morning, and arrived in
Kenton at four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, and return-
ing left Kenton in the morning on alternate days, and arrived at
Sandusky the same day. Of one of these trains plaintiff was the
conductor, and Benjamin R. Pratt was the conductor of the other,
and they were accustomed to pass each other at Tiffin. On the
27th day of December, 1852, the plaintiff and said Pratt, with the
consent of J. A. Barker, the general freight agent of the defendant,
exchanged trains for one trip. On the 28th day of the month last
aforesaid, the plaintiff, with Pratt's train, met Pratt with plaintiff's
train about a mile north of Tiffin, and they exchanged back again,
and the plaintiff took his train, which was going south, and which
had that morning come from Sandusky under the charge of said
Pratt, and proceeded south with it on his way to Kenton. The
plaintiff's train was, when he took it, behind time, and he was fur-
ther and unavoidably delayed at and near Tiffin. The plaintiff
had, on said train, no freight for any station between Tiffin and
Kenton, and after leaving Tiffin he did not stop at any station,
except once or twice to take wood and water for the engine, until
he arrived at Kenton. The plaintiff made no examination of the
cars composing said train, for the purpose of ascertaining the con-
dition of the brakes and machinery therewith connected, or of the
-wheels and running gear, either at the time he took the same from
the hands of Pratt or at any time after that on that day. The
plaintiff arrived at Kenton with said train at about five o'clock
P. M. of the day last aforesaid, and stopped at a warehouse there
for the purpose of discharging some freight. The grade of the
railroad at the point where he stopped, descends toward the south,
and continues to do so from that point for a distance of about 900
feet, at the rate of about 40 feet per mile. In the ordinary course
of business, this train passed down this grade to the bridge on the
Scioto river, and then back into a side track to permit the train
coming from the south to pass. On this occasion, after the plain-
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tiff bad finished discharging freight at said warehouse, said train
was started forward in the direction of said bridge, and after the
engine, with a part of the train, had passed along, the plaintiff, who
was standing near the track in conversation, discovered that the
binder part of the train bad become detached and had been left
behind, but was in motion, and was moving down said grade after
the part of said train attached to the engine. The detached part
of the train, when plaintiff first discovered it, was north of where
he was standing, and was coming towards him, and as soon as he
discovered it he ran to it, got upon the first car, and standing with
one foot on the platform or step in front of the car, and one knee
on top of the car, with his hands took hold of the cross-bar on the
top of the brake-staff; he endeavored to turn the same for the pur-
pose of stopping said cars. At the first effort he did not succeed
in turning said brake. He made another effort, using more force,
when the same suddenly gave way and turned freely; by reason of
which the plaintiff's hands slipped off and he fell to the ground in
front of said car, and one wheel of the car passed over his right
arm between the hand and elbow, crushing it very badly; and the
plaintiff was otherwise injured by the fall. The cars composing said
train were all eight-wheeled box cars, from 24 to 28 feet long, and
about ten feet high, and were all, with one exception, loaded with
lumber. The only men on said train, on that day, when the plain-
tiff took the same from the hands of said Pratt, besides the plaintiff,
were the engineer, fireman and wood-passer. The plaintiff, further
to maintain the issue on his part, introduced James Ford as a wit-
ness, who testified, among other things, that after the accident he
examined the brake of the car from which the plaintiff fell; that
he found the brake-chain broken, and he judged from its appearance
that the break in the chain was an old one. William D. Stearns,
whose deposition was introduced by the plaintiff, testified that he
examined, said brake after said accident, and that he found said
brake-chain broken. There was no further or other evidence intro-
duced on said trial by either party tending to show from any exami-
nation of said brake-chain that it was broken, or when it was
broken ; but there was testimony tending ,o prove that said chain
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broke while plaintiff was working the brake and at the time of the
injury to plaintiff. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to
show that said train became separated at Kenton, as above men-
tioned, by the breaking of a connecting link, and that said link was
defective. The only witness who examined it after it was broken,
and the only one who gave any testimony in relation to any defect
therein, was Geo. R. Crain, whose deposition was introduced by
said plaintiff, and who testified that the defect was that the link was
not sufficiently welded in making. And the plaintiff gave evidence
tending to prove that the brake from which the plaintiff fell, as
aforesaid, was constructed with a cross-bar on the top of the
brake-shaft in this form + for turning the same, and that a brake
thus constructed could not be as safely and conveniently used as one
with a wheel or rim at the top. The defendant gave evidence tend-
ing to prove that the plaintiff, as the conductor of said train, had
the entire management and control of the same while upon the road;
that he had the control of all the other servants of the company em-
ployed in said train; that it was his duty to see that each man upon
the train was at his post, and in the faithful discharge of his duty ;
that if there were no brakemen on said train it was the fault of the
conductor, as the defendant employed a brakeman for the train, and
if he were absent from his post, or neglected to do his duty, it was
the conductor's business to report the fact to the freight agent, who
would, in such case, provide another brakeman for the train. The
defendant gave evidence tending to prove that the train of which
the plaintiff was the conductor aforesaid, was a distributing freight
train; that there were five regular stations on said road, between
Tiffin and Kenton; that it was the duty of the plaintiff, as the con-
ductor of said train, to stop with the same at each station, and at
each station to examine the wheels, running gear, brakes and ma-
chinery connected therewith of the cars comprising said train; that
if any car became unsafe to run, it was the duty of the conductor
to leave it at the first side track; that for a mere defect in the brake
of a car, even if such defect rendered the brake unserviceable, it
would not be the duty of the conductor to switch and leave the car,
but it was his duty to examnine the brakes and keep himself informed
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of their condition, that he might know what brakes could be relied
upon for use, and that he might, on his return to Sandusky, re-
port to the freight agent all defects and deficiencies.
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant requested
the court to give to the jury, among others, the several separate in-
structions following, to wit:
1st. That so far as the plaintiff was concerned, the defendant was
not bound to furnish cars with brakes of any particular construction,
and that the fact, if such be the fact, that the brake-staff on the car
from which the plaintiff fell was surmounted by a cross-bar instead
of a wheel, furnished no grounds of recovery in this case, even though
the jury should find the latter mode of construction to be the safest
and best.
2d. That if the jury find that the plaintiff had been running his
train for one or more trips without brakemen or trainmen, and
without complaint on his part, the fact that there was no such men
on the train at the time of the accident, furnishes no ground for
recovery.
3d. That if the jury find that the absence of brakemen on the
train in plaintiff's charge at the time of the accident, was by reason
of the negligence of Pratt, who, by plaintiff's consent, had con-
ducted said train from Sandusky to Tiffin, when it was taken by the
plaintiff, then such absence of brakemen gives to the plaintiff no right
to recover.
4th. That if the jury find that the injuries of which the plaintiff
complains were occasioned by defect in the machinery or cars
composing the train under the plaintiff's charge, and that such de-
fects were unknown to the defendant, and were of such a character
that the defendant could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, have
detected or avoided them, that for injuries thus occasioned the plain-
tiff cannot recover.
5th. That the plaintiff, in entering into the employ of the defen-
dant as the conductor of any of its freight trains, took upon himself
the ordinary hazard of that business, and that the breaking of a
brake-chain or connecting link, from secret or latent defects therein,
which could not, by ordinary care, have been discovered, is one of
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the ordinary hazards of that business, and for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff, occasioned by such breaking, the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover.
6th. That if the injuries of which the plaintiff complains befell
him by reason of his ignorance of defects in the machinery or cars
composing the train of which he had charge-which defects he
might have known by the exercise of proper care and caution, and
the performance of his duty as the conductor of said train-then he
is not entitled to recover.
7th. That if the plaintiff's neglect of duty as the conductor of the
train in the petition mentioned, contributed, in any degree to pro-
duce the injuries of which he complains, he cannot recover.
And thereupon the court charged the jury as follows, to wit:
"1 GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: After the very patient and attentive
hearing you have given this case, it may be confidently anticipated
that your verdict will be such as the law delights in, and all that the
parties have a right to expect.
"We are living in the patent age of new inventions, and every
one of these inventions exerts its influence either for good or evil,
or both, on society. Amongst the most remarkable of these modern
improvements is the application of steam to the running of wheeled
carriages. The good and salutary effect of this great improvement
in the mode of travel and transportation, are seen and felt, and
acknowledged everywhere within the circle of its influence; and
all men are interested in preserving, improving and perfecting this
great instrument for the dissemination of thought, and for the
interchange and distribution of the products of the soil and the
work-shop.
"But to preserve it, and make it what it is so well calculated to
be, a help and benefactor, it must be properly managed by prudent
men, men of intelligence, men who know well their respective duties
in their respective stations, and will perform them regardless of all
consequences. When it ceases to be so managed, it will have ceased
to be a blessing, and had better be abandoned. The law, then, in
holding the proprietors of these roads to a strict and faithful dis-
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charge of their duties, seeks to preserve their usefulness to the com-
munity by malting them respond in money for any injury sustained
through the improper management of those having them in charge.
These railroad companies, being new creations, their legal liabilities
are not so clearly and exactly ascertained and defined as those of
persons who have been the subjects of the law for centuries. Yet
their rights, their duties and liabilities, must be ascertained; and
when their rights have been encroached upon, they must have
redress; when they have committed a wrong, or failed to discharge
a legal duty, they must be held responsible, and a court of justice
and a jury of intelligent gentlemen is a proper tribunal to try the
facts and administer redress. To you, then, gentlemen, as to an
intelligent and impartial tribunal, this controversy is submitted, and
you will, of course, try and treat it as though it were between natu-
ral persons. You are not to know, in your deliberations and con-
clusions, whether these parties are natural or artificial: a corporation
may not have, and, in fact, has not a soul to save; but it has a pocket
to condemn, and the fact that many of their pockets, at this particular
period, are utterly empty, is rather a misfortune than a crime.
However, as this tribunal tries pocket, and not soul cases, the mere
fact that this defendant is soulless must not, in the least, be allowed
to affect or influence your deliberations or conclusions. Try the
case as between persons standing as perfect equals before the laws.
What, then, is the real issue between these parties which you are
called to try and pass upon ? In order to answer in your presence,
this question in an intelligible and effective manner, it will be
necessary to revert to the evidence in the case. But in alluding to
the evidence, I intend only to speak of those facts about which
there is no controversy: the controverted facts are for your deter-
mination alone. The plaintiff, on the 28th day of December, 1852,
was in the employ of the defendant, (the defendant being a rail-
road company,) to conduct, between Sandusky and Renton, on
defendant's road, a train of cars for the transportation and distri-
bution of freight. This is simply and entirely the contract. But
this contract attaches to itself a great many legal and necessary
incidents. What are these incidents ? As to the plaintiff, first, he
35
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hired for a specific, fixed and certain purpose. ie is presumed to
have known the nature, the hazard and the responsibility of the
business upon which he was entering, and to have entered upon it
with all its duties, hazards and responsibilities staring him in the face;
and he was bound to discharge his duty with such prudence, care
and vigilance, as the hazard to life and limb and property demanded.
If he has failed so to perform his duty, and the injury of which
he complains is the result of such failure on his part, he is the
victim of his own fault, and has no right to complain of another.
In such case he could not recover. We know of no law defining
the various duties of the conductor of a train of cars. It is a
question of fact, and you must answer it from the evidence in the
case. This, then, will be your first inquiry-What were the duties
of A. 0. Barber as conductor ? Secondly-Did he perform those
duties ? Third-If he did not do his duty, are the injuries of which
he complains the result of his omission of duty? What were his
duties in relation to the machinery composing his train at the time
of receiving it at Sandusky or Kenton ? Did the company rely
upon him to examine, detect and report defects in the material of
the train, and did they give him to understand that this was a part
of his duty, or is this a settled fixed part of the duties of all freight
train conductors ? Did the company rely upon the conductor to
perform this service ? Did the conductor, by the contract which
placed him in the employ of the company, either expressly or by
implication of law growing out of the peculiar relation of himself
to the company, undertake to perform this service ? If he did so
undertake, and failed to perform these duties, and his injury is the
result of such failure to perform, he is the victim of his own fault.
He cannot complain of another. In such case he will not be enti-
tled to recover. Make this same inquiry as to the duties of the
plaintiff in relation to the material of his train in its passage from
the point where he received to the point where he discharged it. Did
he, either expressly by .the terms of his contract, or by implication
of law growing out of his peculiar relation to the company, under-
take to bestow certain care, diligence and attention upon the machi-
nery and other material composing his train? If there was such
RAILROAD COMPANY vs. BARBER.
an undertaking on the part of the plaintiff, did he perform it ? If
he did not, and his injuries are the result of such omission on his
part, he has no reason to complain, and will have no right to
recover. So inquire what were the duties of this plaintiff toward
the machinery in all positions. What were his duties at Kenton ?
If his injury is the result of his own negligence or omission of duty,
he cannot recover. What was his duty when he saw the detached
cars following the train ? If to reach the brake, break it down,
and stop the cars, was an act calculated to save the train or machi-
nery from impending danger and probable injury, or to prevent
injury to the men on the engine, it was a praiseworthy and manly
act on his part to make the effort, and if, in that effort, he sustained
his injuries through no fau't or negligence or carelessness of his own,
but by the fault or omission of the company, in such case he would
have a right to recover. But though he sustained his injuries while
engaged in this laudable effort to save life and property, yet if they
were the result of his own negligence or want of care, he cannot
recover. The railroad company employed Barber to conduct a
freight train. By that contract, what did the company undertake
to do ? The first thing the company bound itself to do, was to
furnish the plaintiff with a train to run; a proper train, having all
the necessary machinery and appendages of a good and safe kind,
and believed by the company, after a careful and skilful examina-
tion, to be good and safe to the employees, both in style and struc-
ture, according to the danger and hazard of the business. They
undertook to furnish said train and machinery in good and safe
condition; they undertook to devote reasonable care, attention and
diligence to the machinery and other material that made up the
train ; and this either by the plaintiff or some other person. They
undertook to furnish the train with such number of hands, pos-
sessing reasonable skill, as were necessary to the safe conduct of
the train. They agreed, in short, that everything necessary for
the conduct of the train with safety to the. conductor, should be
done on their part. And finally, they undertook to be responsible to
Barber for the negligence and carelessness of certain of their em-
ployees, through which negligence or carelessness an injury might
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result to him. And in the discharge of every one of these under-
takings they were to use reasonable and proper care, diligence and
skill. And what is reasonable care and skill, depends much on the
nature of the enterprise. That which would be reasonable care in
driving a team of steady road horses, might not be so in driving
a-pair of unbroken, fractious colts. That which would be reasona-
bly skillful and careful in providing a lock for a road wagon, 2night
not be so in providing a brake for a train of cars. The reasonable-
ness of the care, skill and diligence, must depend altogether on the
nature of the enterprise. When a party puts a dangerous body in
motion, the care, skill and diligence required in order to be reason-
able, must be of a high order. If the one is very dangerous, the
other must be of a very high order. Where the one is most danger-
ous, the other, to be reasonable, must be of the highest order. Now,
inquire of the evidence whether the railroad company has performed
these undertakings. If they have performed these and all other
undertakings on their part, if they have been guilty of neither care-
lessness, negligence or want of skill, they are not liable."
And the court further instructed the jury as follows:
"That as to the instruction first requested by the defendant as
aforesaid, the court would not give the same in the form requested,
but would give it with this modification : that though the defendant
was not bound to provide brakes of any particular construction, yet
that it was bound to furnish good brakes of a safe kind, provided brakes
were at all necessary, (which was a question depending on the evi-
dence.) And that it was not a question between the kinds of brakes,
but were brakes necessary to the safe conduct of the train, and if
so, were those furnished such as reasonable skill, diligence and care
would have furnished as safe brakes. That as to the instruction
secondly requested by the defendant as aforesaid, the court refused
to give the same, and said to the jury that such was not the law in
Ohio, unless by the express or implied terms of his contract it was
a part of his duty to determine the number, care and skillfulness of
the trainmen and brakemen, or to employ and provide them; if such
were his duty, and he failed to perform it, it furnished no ground of
recovery, otherwise, if this duty devolved on other employees of the
company, not under control of the plaintiff. That as to the in-
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struction thirdly requested by the defendant, as aforesaid, the court
refused to give the same in manner and form as requested, but in-
structed the jury that if the plaintiff and Pratt had exchanged trains,
without the consent of the defendant, then the defendant was not
liable for Pratt's negligence; but if said exchange was made with
the defendant's consent, or under their direction, then Pratt was sim-
ply the agent of the company for the delivery of the train to Barber
on the road when they might meet, and in that case defendant was
liable for the negligence of Pratt, exactly in the same manner and
to the same extent they would have been liable for the negligence of
any other agent, whose duty they had made it to deliver to plaintiff
a reasonably safe train and machinery. That as to the instructions
fourthly requested by the defendant, as aforesaid, the court refused
to give the same in its terms, but said to the jury that the defendant
would not be liable for such defects, as it could not, by the exercise of
reasonable care, have detected, and what was reasonable care, in
this case, had been already explained.
"That as to the instruction fifthly by the defendant above re-
quested as aforesaid, the court refused to give in its terms, but said
to the jury, that as to the care which the defendant was bound to
exercise, it must be reasonable, and what was reasonable care, under
the circumstances, they had already explained; that what was
reasonable, as before stated to them, depended on the nature and
hazard of the enterprise or business in which they were engaged.
That as to the instruction by the defendant sixthly requested as
aforesaid, the court refused to give the same in its terms, but in-
structed the jury that it was right, provided it was the plaintiff's
duty to examine for and detect these defects, and whether it was his
duty thus to do, was a question of fact for the jury to determine, and
was it a part of his duty, or was it no part of his duty, was for them
to say. Was it the duty of other employees, over whom plaintiff had
no control ? That as to the instructions seventhly by the defendant
requested as aforesaid, the court refused to give the same, in its
terms, but said to the jury, that if the plaintiff's neglect of his
duty caused the injury, or was such as that, without it, the injury
would not have happened to him, then the plaintiff could not recover.
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But though he might have been guilty of negligence, yet if the acci-
dent was unavoidable, by reason of defendant's fault or omission, and
must have happened though plaintiff had done his entire duty, in such
case plaintiff would have a right to recover, and that whenever the
plaintiff's right to recover was spoken of in the charge, it was under
the limitations and instructions contained in the charge as an en-
tirety."
To all of which instructions and charge, so given by the court
to the jury, and to the refusal of the court to instruct and charge
the jury as requested by the defendants, the defendants excepted.
The verdict of the jury was in favor of Barber, for nine thousand
five hundred dollars.
Thereupon the defendants filed a motion for a new trial, and
the same was overruled by the court, and judgment entered on the
verdict.
Upon this state of facts, the plaintiff in error makes an assign-
ment of errors, claiming in substance:
1st. That the petition of the plaintiff below does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action ; or rather, that from said
petition itself it appears that the plaintiff below was not entitled to
recover.
2d. That the court below erred in its charge to the jury, and
erred in refusing to charge as requested by the defendant below.
W. T7. Stone and N. ff. Swane, for plaintiff in error.
(. -X. Watson and J. . Lee, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARTLEY, C. J.-The judgment sought to be reversed was reco-
vered in the District Court by Barber, the defendant in error, for
an injury received by him while employed and acting as the con-
ductor of a train of freight cars on the railroad of the plaintiff in
error. The alleged ground of the company's liability was:
1st. Failure and neglect to provide the train with the necessary
number of hands to manage and control the same; and
2d. Failure and neglect to furnish the train with necessary, suit-
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able and safe machinery for running and managing the same; and
for negligently and wrongfully furnishing the train with defective
and unsafe machinery, and cars with platforms unsuitable and
unsafe to stand on in working the said machinery.
The main and leading questions presented in this case, therefore,
arise out of the duties and obligations created by the relation be-
tween Barber as the conductor of a train of cars, and the company
as his employer. This relation, both as to its nature and its legal
incidents, differs somewhat from that of a subordinate hand on the
train, and the company; it also differs from that of a passenger on
a train of cars, and the company ; and it also differs from that of a
person receiving an injury on the railroad, who is neither a passen-
ger nor an employee. As between the company, and a person who
is neither a passenger nor an employee, there is no relation arising
out of any privity of contract; consequently any liability of the
former, for an injury to the latter, can be determined only by that
pervading principle of social duty founded on the common law, that
every person must so conduct his own affairs as not to injure the
rights of another, expressed in the legal maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alientm non iWas.
As between a passenger and the railroad company, the duty of
safe conveyance is measured by a severe rule arising out of the
nature of the obligation, and a principle of public policy. Those
who ordinarily intrust themselves, in traveling, to the agents and
vehicles of railroad companies, have but limited means of informa-
tion as to either the competency or fidelity of the agents, or the
sufficiency of the cars and machinery; and passengers undertake
to run those risks only, which cannot be avoided by the utmost de-
gree of care and skill, on the part of the carrier, in the preparation
and management of the means of conveyance. Such is the doc-
trine both of the English and the American courts. .fegeman vs.
The Western Railroad Corporation, 8 Kernan IR. 9; Story on
Bailm., sees. 601, 602; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 222.
The nature of the relation between the company and its agents
and employees, being essentially different from that between the
company and passengers, the duties and obligations arising out of
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it are different, and consequently give rise to a different rule of
liability. The company can act only through its agents and em-
ployees, who are engaged in a common enterprise, in which they
share the responsibility, and in which the safety of each depends
much on the efficiency with which every other performs his duty.
They have opportunities of observing the conduct of each other,
nnd requiring fidelity by reporting delinquencies; and they have
means of information as to the sufficiency of the machinery, and
the condition of the road, as well as opportunities of adopting pre-
cautions for safety not ordinarily open to passengers. And they
make their engagements to serve the company in view of the
natural and ordinary hazards incident to the business, and must
be presumed to stipulate for a proportionate compensation.
It was adjudged in the case of The Little Miami Railroad Cor-
panny vs. Stevens, 20 Ohio Rep., that when an employer places one
person in his employ, under the direction of another, also in his em-
ploy, st. ' employer is liable for injuries to the person placed in the
subordi'wte situation, by the negligence of his superior. And this
doctrine was reviewed and affirmed by the court in the case of The
C. . C. Railroad Company vs. _eary, 3 Ohio St. Rep. 201,
upon the ground that the injured agent or employee, at the time of
the injury, was acting under the immediate control and direction' of
his superior, by whose neglect the injury was received, and thus
occupied a position which precluded him, for the time being, from
exercising his own discretion in looking to and providing for his own
safety.
The principle settled in these cases, however, is distinguishable
from that which governs in the case before us. Here Barber, at
the time of the injury, was not under the direction or control of any
superior officer or agent of the company. He had the control and
charge of the train himself as its conductor. True, the train and
the road were the property of the company. But the charge and
use of the train were committed to Barber, who was et the time, so
far as that train was concerned, the sole representative of the com-
pany. This superintending charge gave him power to regulate the
speed of the train, to run it or to stop it, and to control and direct
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it in any emergency, according to the dictates of his own judgment.
True, he was to use and manage the train in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed by the company, but in doing so he
was not under the directing authority of any superior or superin-
tending agent of the company. The responsibility of his position
imposed upon him the duty of reasonable care and diligence, not
only in the management of the train, but also in the due inspection
of the cars, machinery and apparatus committed to his charge, and
in case of any insufficiency in the number of the hands, or delin-
quency in the performance of duty by the hands on the train, or in
case of any defect in the cars or machinery, to report the same to
the company, and forthwith take the necessary and proper precau-
tions for the safety of the train and the persons upon it.
Under these circumstances, what risks did Barber assume to run,
and what duties and obligations rested upon the company ? The
business was hazardous, and he undertook the employment and
made his engagement in contemplation of the perils incident to it.
The company did not insure him against accident, or those unfore-
seen perils which due and proper care and diligence could not pro-
vide against. Injuries from accidents, which the utmost stretch of
human skill and foresight cannot provide against, are incident to
all situations and conditions in life. And because one person is in
the employ of another in a hazardous business, it does not follow
that the employer must stand responsible for damages resulting from
injuries received through accidents, which a proper degree of dili-
gence and skill cannot guard against.
The company was presumed to use reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence in the selection and employment of competent
and suitable agents and employees, in keeping its road in repair,
and in providing it with sufficient a-nd suitable cars and machinery
for its use. And in Barber's undertaking to act as the conductor
of this train of freight cars, he may be presumed to have stipu-
lated in contemplation of the performance of this reasonable and
ordinary duty on the part of the company, and to have under-
taken to have incurred all the risks and hazards of the business,
on that condition. The company, therefore, became responsible
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to him only in case of an injury received by him through a neglect
of that reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the per-
formance of its duty, which it was presumed to exercise, and in
contemplation of which its employees make their engagements.
And this neglect, in order to create a liability on the part of the
company, must be the wrongful act of the company as distinguished
from the neglect of a mere operative or agent of the company.
For, however as to passengers, or persons who are neither passen-
gers, agents or employees, a railroad company may be responsible
for injuries done by the neglect or misconduct of its agents or em-
ployees, while engaged in the business of the company, it appears
to be settled, both in England and in this country, that the com-
pany is not liable to an operative or agent in its employ, for inju-
ries resulting from the carelessness of another operative or agent,
when both are engaged in a common service, and no power or con-
trol is exercised by the one over the other. C. C C. Railroad
Cowpany vs. Keary, 3 Ohio St. Rep. 201; Redfield on Railways,
886. And this doctrine, that the company is not liable to one em-
ployee for injuries received from another in the same business or
service, it is said, tends to make all employees anxious, watchful,
and interested for the fidelity of each other, and it is one of the
risks in view of which every employee enters the service of the
company. But this doctrine, that the principal is not liable to one
agent or servant for an injury arising from the neglect or miscon-
duct of other agents or servants, must be received with this qualifi-
cation, that the principal is without fault in the selection and em-
ployment of the other agents and servants, or in continuing them
in their places after they have been shown to be incompetent or
unsuitable persons. Of the cases in which it has been held that a
principal is not liable to one agent or servant for an injury caused
by the wrongful act of another agent or servant engaged in the
same business, it was said by the Court of Appeals, in New York,
in the case of Keegan vs. Th]e Western Railroad Company, 4 Sel-
den R. 180, that "They are applicable only where the injury com-
plained of happened without any actual fault or misconduct of the
principal, either in the act which caused the injury, or in the selec-
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tion and employment of the agent by whose fault it did happen.
Whenever the injury results from the actual negligence or misfeas-
ance of the principal, he is liable as well in the case of one of his
employees or agents, as in any other."
It appears that a principal is liable in damages for an injury
sustained by his agent or employee while in his service, only where
the injury is the result of an omission of that reasonable and ordi-
nary care on the part of the principal himself in the discharge of
his duty which persons of ordinary prudence are presumed to ex-
ercise in that particular pursuit. Where, therefore, an agent or
employee of a railroad company has been injured by means of the
neglect of ordinary diligence and care on the part of the company,
either in not employing a sufficient number of hands to manage and
safely run a train, or in employing, or continuing in the employ-
ment of the company, incompetent and unsuitable persons, or in
not keeping the road in proper repair, or in providing the road
with insufficient, defective, and unsafe machinery and cars;-in
either case, the company is liable. But the company would not be
liable, even in any such case, providing the agent or employee was
himself guilty of neglect or misconduct, at the time, which con-
tributed to the injury; or providing the agent or employee, with a
full knowledge of such omission of duty or neglect on the part of
the company, waive the matter, by continuing in the service of the
company without taking the precaution, or using his exertions, to
have the omission or difficulty remedied. For if the agent or em-
ployee of the company waive the omission of duty on the part of
the company, he takes the risk upon himself, and if damaged, he
must abide by the maxim volenti non fit injuria.
A careful examination of the duties and obligations incident to
the relation of employer and employee, touching the questions in
the case before us, leads to the following conclusions:
1st. That the agent or employee of a railroad company under-
takes his engagement in contemplation of the ordinary hazards of
the business, and upon the incidental condition, not that the com-
pany will insure him against accidental injuries, but will exercise
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reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of its
duties in regard to the business.
2d. That the company is not liable to one agent or servant for
an injury resulting from the negligence or misconduct of another
agent or servant while engaged in a common business with him,
but without any superior authority or control over him.
3d. But where the company itself is in fault as to its own
peculiar duties, and by means of its neglect of that reasonable and
ordinary care which it must be presumed to exercise in regard
to its own business, an injury is occasioned to an agent or em-
ployee, the company is liable in damages, unless the agent was
also in fault, and his negligence or misconduct contributed as a
proximate cause to the injury.
4th. If, however, the agent, with a full knowledge of the omis-
sion and neglect of ordinary care on the part of the company,
continues on in the business of the company, without any correc-
tion of such omission or neglect, he thereby waives his own rights,
and takes the risk on himself.
The application of these conclusions to the case before us, re-
moves all difficulty in the determination of the main questions
presented.
The first ground of neglect charged upon the company, is'the
failure to furnish the train with a sufficient number of hands. It
appears from the testimony of the engineer, that there was neither
a brakeman nor a trainman on the train, on the day of the
accident; that the train never had a brakeman, and that for
about four days, or two trips, it had been without a trainman; and
he further testifies, that there ought to have been one trainman and
two brakemen on the train. In the absence of either a brakeman
or a trainman, the conductor had of course to perform, to some
extent, the duties of both ; and he was in the act of performing
the duty of one of these subordinate hands, when he received
the injury complained of.
It appears, therefore, that the company was guilty of a neglect
of due and reasonable care, in the failure to supply the train with
a sufficient number of hands for its safe and proper management.
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But in the charge and control of the train, Barber was the direct-
ing agent, and sole representative of the company. It was his du-
ty to notify the company of the want of sufficient hands, and to
require the company f-- -",rnish them. It is not averred in the pe-
tition, nor does it appear in the proof, that the company had a
knowledge that this train was running without a sufficient num-
ber of hands, or that the conductor had either given the com-
pany notice of the insufficiency of hands on the train, or required
them to be supplied. So far, therefore, as the deficiency in .the
number of hands upon the train contributed to the injury, the
maxim, volenti gion fit injuria, applies. It is an old settled rule
of the common law, that no one can maintain an action for a wrong,
where he has consented or contributed to the act which has occa-
sioned it.
The other ground, iipon which the recovery was sought below,
was the alleged failure and neglect of the company to furnish
sufficient and safe machinery and cars; and the alleged wrongful
and r.egligent act of the company in actually furnishing the train
with defective, unsafe, and insufficient cars and machinery.
It appears, that there was a defect in the link 'which connected
the third and fourth car of the train back of the engine, on account
of its not having been sufficiently welded in the making, by means of
which a separation in the train took place. It appears further, that
the break on the first car of the detached portion of the train was in a
bad condition for want of connection between the brake blocks; that
the brake chain was defective, and broke when Barber was attempt-
ing to use it to stop the detached portion of the train on a down
grade. The top of the brake-staff was a cross-bar, and the platform
for a person to stand on to work the brake, was claimed to be insuffi-
cient and unsafe. By means of these defects in the cars and ma-
chinery, the accident occurred, by which the defendant in error
received the injury.
The duty imposed on the company by the relation occupied by
the conductor, was to use reasonable and ordinary care and dili-
gence in furnishing him with sufficient, sound and safe cars and
machinery for the train. This duty required not only that the
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company should use proper skill and diligence in procuring and
furnishing sufficient and safe cars and machinery, but also when
notified that they had become insufficient and unsafe, or when they
had been in use as long as they could with safety be used, to take
them off the road until repaired and made sufficient and safe. And
for any injury sustained by an agent or employee of the company,
from any neglect of this duty, the company would be liable. But
the relation occupied by the agent or employee, imposes a reciprocal
duty upon him. It was the duty of Barber, as the conductor of this
train, to use ordinary and reasonable skill and diligence on his part,
not simply in the management of the train, but also in supervising
the due inspection of the cars, machinery, and apparatus, as to their
sufficiency and safety while under his charge; and on the discovery
of any defect or insufficiency, to notify the company, and to take
the proper precautions to guard against danger therefrom. And if
he was injured by the negligence of the company in furnishing, or
continuing to use defective cars and machinery, yet if his own neg-
lect of duty in the management of the train, or due inspection of
the cars and machinery in his charge, contributed as a proximate
cause of the injury, he could have no right of action against the
company for damages; or if he knew of the defects and insufficiency
of the cars or machinery, and without taking the necessary 'and
proper precaution to guard against danger, continued to use them,
he took upon himself the risk, and waived his right as against the
company. If there was no neglect of due and ordinary care and
4fligence on the part of the company in furnishing, or continuing
the use of the cars and machinery, and the injury was caused by
latent defects, unknown alike to the company and to the conductor,
and not discoverable by due and ordinary skill and diligence in the
inspection of the cars and machinery, it would be a misadventure,
falling among the casualties incident to the busincss, and for which
no one could be blamed. But if the defects which caused the injury
were actually unknown either to the company or the conductor, and
not discoverable by due and ordinary inspection, and yet were such
ag resulted from a neglect of reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence on the part of the company, either in procuring the cars
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or machinery to be made, or in continuing their use on the road
beyond the time when they could be safely used, the company would
be liable in damages for the injury. And whether such was the case
or not, was a matter of fact for submission, under proper instruc-
-tions, to the jury in the court below.
The view of the law here expressed as applicable to this case, and
in which we all concur, is at variance with the instructions given by
the court below to the jury, in various particulars.
The charge of the district court to the jury, taken in its whole
context, together with the instructions asked by counsel, and refused
or qualified by the court, gave an erroneous view of the law which
governs this case.
The court instructed the jury as to the rule of liability applica-
ble to the company, without the proper qualification where the fault
of the conductor contributes as a proximate cause to the injury, or
where the conductor, with a knowledge of omissions and neglect on
the part of the company, waives its obligations, and takes the risk
upon himself.
And the court instructed the jury as to the company's liabilty, as
follows: "They undertook to furnish said train and machinery in
good and safe condition; they undertook to devote reasonable care,
attention and diligence to the machinery and other material that
made up the train; and this, either byi the plaintiff or some other
person. They undertook to furnish the train with such number of
hands, possessing reasonable skill, as were necessary to the safe
conduct of the train. They agreed, in short, that everything neces
sary for the conduct of the train with safety to the conductor,
should be done on their part. And finally, they undertook to be
responsible to Barber for the negligence or carelessness of certain of
their employees, through whose negligence or carelessness an injury
might result to him. And in the discharge of these undertakings
they were to use reasonable and proper care, diligence and skill.',
And in this connection, the court charged, that "that care, skill
and diligence, in order to be reasonable when a party puts in motion
a most dangerous body, must be of the zighest order." And the
RAILROAD COMPANY vs. BARBER.
court continued in these words: "Now, inquire of the evidence
whether the railroad company has performed these undertakings.
If they have performed these, and all other undertakings on their
part, if they have been guilty of neither carelessness, negligence, or
want of skill, they are not liable."
Now the court, in thus charging, did not state the duty and obli-
gations of .the company with accuracy ; did not distinguish between
general acts of neglect on the part of the company, and negligence
contributing either as a remote or a proximate cause to the injury;
but by direct implication gave the impression, that if the company
had neglected any of its undertakings, either those mentioned or
others, or been guilty of any act of negligence or want of skill,
whether the same was connected with, or contributed as a proxi-
mate cause, to the injury or not, the company was liable to this
action. The charge in this respect was calculated at least to mis-
lead the jury.
The court gave the instruction that the company "undertook to
be responsible to Barber for the negligence and carelessness of cer-
tain of their employees, through whose negligence or carelessness
an injury might result to him," as a rule of law applicable to this
case, without further qualification or explanation. As Barber was
not acting under the immediate direction or control of any supe-
rior officer or agent -of the company at the time, this instruction, as
applied to this case, was directly at variance with the doctrine of
the case of the C. & C. Railroad Company vs. Kfeary, 3 Ohio
St. Rep. 201.
The court also erred in instructing the jury, that what constituted
"the various duties of a conductor of a train of cars," incident to
his position, was a question of fact to be found by the jury from
the evidence. Now what constitutes negligence in regard to a
duty enjoined by any particular relation or employment, is usually,
if not invariably, a mixed question of law and of fact; but what
duty the law implies as incident to any particular relation or
employment, is always a question of law for the determination of
the court.
CABEEN ET AL. vs. CAMPBELL ET AL.
It is also assigned for error, that the petition does not set forth
sufficient legal grounds to constitute a cause of action.
It is essential that the plaintiff, in order to lay a sufficient foun-
dation for a recovery and judgment for an injury received by him
while acting as the conductor of a train of cars, should aver, or
show in his petition, in addition to the allegation that he had no
knowledge of the insufficiency or defects which were the alleged
cause of the injury, that he had exercised due care and diligence in
the use, and also in the examination and inspection of the cars and
machinery belonging to the train, while the same was under his
charge and direction. The petition contains no such averment,
and on this ground, is fatally defective.
Other questions are made in this case, but it is not deemed neces-
sary to express the views of the court upon them.
Judgment of the District Court reversed, and cause remanded.
I the Supreme Court of Pennsq Ivania, Hay, 1858.
CABEEN ET AL. vs. CAMPBELL ET AL.
1. As long as the goods are on their way to the vendee, and while in the hands of
the middle man, the vendor's lien remains, and he may enforce it by stoppage in
transitu.
2. Constructive delivery discussed. Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East. 175, approved.
This case came up on a writ of error to the District Court of
Philadelphia county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The right of a vendor to arrest goods sold while
they are in transitu to the vendee, is a right eminently favored by
the law. So strongly is it maintained that the vendor is permitted
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to resume his popsession by any means not criminal, while the pro-
perty is on the transit. No intervening attachment or execution
against the vendee will defeat the right, or be allowed to interpose
any obstacle to the vendor's resumption of possession. Nor is this
indulgence to the seller without substantial reason. It is grossly
inequitable that his goods, before having reached the hands of the
vendee and before payment, should be appropriated to the satisfac-
tion of other creditors, when the vendee becomes insolvent. In
accordance with this obvious dictate of natural justice, therefore, so
long as the goods are on their way to the vendee, and while they
are in the hands of a middle man or a carrier, the equitable lien of
the vendor remains a lien, which he may enforce by arresting the
further transit in any way, even by a simple notice.
But when transit is once at an end, and the delivery is complete,
the lien of the vendor is gone. Thenceforth the right to arrest the
goods ceases. The question, therefore, ever is, where does the
transit end? The answer to this question would be attended with
no difficulty were it not that the law recognizes a constructive
delivery as sufficient to defeat the vendor's lien. What is, and what
is not a constructive delivery, is often not easy to determine. Until
the goods have arrived at the place of ultimate destination, under-
stood as such between the buyer and seller, they are ordinarily lia-
ble to stoppage. But when an intermediate delivery occurs, before
they reach their ultimate destination, if the party to whom they are
delivered has authority to receive them and give to them a new
destination, not originally intended, the transitus is at an end: they
have then reached the ultimate destination intended by both buyer
and seller. But if the middle man be a mere agent to transmit
the goods in accordance with original directions, the vendor's right
continues. The rule may be stated as follows .- If in the hands of
the middle man they require new orders to put them again in motion
and give them another substantive destination; if without such new
orders they must continue stationary, then the delivery is complete,
and the lien of the vendor has expired. This is the doctrine in
.Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East, 175, which is a leading case, and
such is the recognized law of this State.
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What, then, was the character of the agency of Cabeen & Co., the
middle men in this case ? Were they agents for custody alone, or
were they agents for transmission ? If the latter, then Seidel's
right to stop the blooms continued until they should reach Trenton,
where the buyer lived, or until they should come into Ohevrier's
actual possession. We think the case stated shows them to have
been agents for transmission, and that Trenton was the ultimate
destination intended by the vendor and the vendee. The vendor's
iron works were at Monroe Forge. The vendee's place of business
was at Trenton. Cabeen & Co. were at Philadelphia, on the line
of transportation from Monroe Forge to Trenton. The blooms
were dispatched on this route, not to the agents of the vendee, but
to agents of the vendor's selection, accompanied by instructions to
deliver to the order of the vendee, at Trenton. The agents under-
stood from the instructions, not that they were to retain the blooms.
until orders from Chevrier should again put them in motion, but-
that they were to forward. Without waiting for further orders, or-
even to communicate with the vendee, they shipped a part ofthe-
goods immediately to Trenton. There is, at least, as much reason
for the belief that the word "Trenton" in Seidel's instructions to.
Cabeen & Co. (contained in his letter of Jan. 6, 1855,) wasintended:
to designate the place at which the delivery was to be made, as that
its purpose was to describe the person to whose order the goods.
were committed. That delivery at Trenton was also originally con-
templated by the purchaser, is apparent from his letter to Cabeen.
& Co., dated Jan. 9, 1855. In that letter he writes of having beet,
informed that the blooms had been sent to him; assumes that they
would forward them without further orders than they had received
from Seidel, and objects only to their being sent by railroad;, It
must therefore' have been the understanding alike of the vendori the
vendee, and the middle men, that Trenton was the-place of. ulti-
mate destination, when the blooms were started., on their transit
from Monroe Forge.
The case is not, then, within the principle of -Dizon vs. Baldwin,
and its cognate cases. Cabeen & Co. must be~regarded as a mere
forwarding house. Thus they seem to h-- ve been. regarded by all
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the parties to the sale and delivery. The transit therefore was not
complete, and the right of Seidel to resume possession remained.
In Fritehead vs. Anderson, 9 Meeson & Welsby, 534, the law
is declared to be well settled, "1 that the unpaid vendor has a right
to retake the goods before they have arrived at the original destina-
tion contemplated by the purchaser."
So in Covell vs. Hitchcock, 23 Wendell, 611, the Court of
Appeals of New York ruled, the right to stop goods in transitu
exists during the whole period of the transit from the vendor to the
purchaser, or the place of ultimate destination as designated to the
vendor by the buyer, and that this transit continues so long as the
goods remain in the possession of a middle man, whether he be the
carrier, or keeper of the warehouse or place of deposit connected
with the transmission and delivery of the goods. In that case the
transit was held to continue, though the goods were in a warehouse
at the place to which they had been directed by the buyer to be
sent, it being an intermediate point between the place of sale and
the ultimate destination of the goods. This is also the doctrine of
our own courts. In .Bayes vs. Mouille, 2 Harris, 48, goods had been
delivered to an agent of the vendee. He delivered them to a for-
warding house which shipped them. They came to the hands of
other forwarders, yet the right of stoppage was held to remain."
These cases certainly go further to maintain this favored right of
the vendor than we need follow in the case now before us. In all
of them the middle man was the agent of the vendee, selected by
him. In the present case, Cabeen & Co. were the agents of the
seller, and were understood alike by themselves, the buyer and
seller, to be agents for transmission to the place of *original desti-
nation.
Judgment reversed, and judgment entered on the case stated, for
the defendants.1
I The reader is referred to 5 Am. Law Reg. 683, where the facts of this case and
the opinion of District Court will be found reported.-Ed. Am. L. Reg.
REEVES vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Hay, 1858.
ELISHA REEVES VS. THE DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. In actions for negligence it is the duty of the judge charging the jury to define
the legal signification of negligence, and then to refer the question of fact to the
jury to say where and to whom the negligence attaches.
2. It is the general rule in the American courts, that where both parties are in fault,
or guilty of the negligence which causes the loss, neither can recover against
the other.
3. At the intersection of a railway and turnpike, the traveler by the highway has a
right to be within the rails long enough to cross them, but he is bound to look out
for trains, and must not rush heedlessly nor remain unnecessarily on a spot where
the law allows engines to be propelled.
This case came up on a writ of error to the Common Pleas of
Susquehanna county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-The errors assigned are not founded upon
answers to the specific instructions prayed, but upon dismembered
sentences of the charge. It is impossible to conceive of a more
unsatisfactory mode of reviewing a legal opinion. It is neither
analysis nor criticism, but rude surgery; mere amputation. No
written document, not even that of inspired pens, can bear such
mutilation. What the court became responsible for, no particular
instructions being asked, was the general effect of their charge on
the minds of the jurors, and this is to be judged of, not by sen-
tences culled here and there, but by che salient points of the charge,
and the thoughts that permeate it through and through. If as a
whole the charge was calculated to mislead the jury, there is error
on the record; if not, there is none. Mere omissions to say what
might have been properly said, are no just ground of complaint by
a party who submitted no propositions and suggested no views of
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the testimony for the consideration of the court. Judges are enti-
tled to expect this kind of assistance from counsel, and when it is
not rendered, counsel may still have the benefit of errors of commis-
sion, but they should not dbmplain of omissions.
This case, though falling within a class that is becoming very
numerous under our extensive system of railroads, is in some of its
features peculiar and difficult. That the plaintiff had a right to
travel the turnpike road with his drove of cattle, is not denied, but
it is insisted that it was an extraordinary and unusual use of the
highway, and should have been attended with a corresponding
degree of care on the part of the drover. A large drove of cattle
is, it is true, an unwieldly body to manage, but we cannot regard
its presence on the turnpike as extraordinary. To facilitate the
driving of cattle to the eastern markets was one of the purposes for
which so many turnpike roads pointing westward were built, and
they have always been extensively used for this purpose. The rail-
road company were bound to take notice of this fact when they
located their road across the turnpike, and in its immediate vicinity
for a considerable distance. They knew that large droves of cattle
were accustomed to travel there, that drovers had the prior right,
and the provision of the charter, that the railroad should be so con-
structed as not to obstruct the travel on the turnpike, was declhra-
tory of the plaintiff's common law right, which he enjoyed in com-
mon with all the public, to travel the turnpike with droves as well
as with teams.
Still, he was bound to use reasonable care. The unquestionable-
ness of his right of transit did not release him from the obligation
of that degree of diligence and prudence which men in his situation
ordinarily exercise. He was a- drover of a large herd of fat cattle ;
he was in the vicinity of a railroad on which locomotive trains are
entitled and accustomed to run; he was approaching a crossing at
grade; he knew that a train that was behind time, was momentarily
expected to be at that point. Such was his situation. Now what
prudent men in general would do, or forbear to do in these circum-
stances, was the rule by which the plaintiff was bound to regulate
his conduct.
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But, one other circumstance must be mentioned, as affecting the
situation of the plaintiff, and entering into the rule of duty. It
was right to presume that the agents of the company would exer-
cise reasonable care on their part in the conduct of the train. What
was reasonable care on their part? They were the servants of a
company who had located their railroad parallel to and in the
vicinity of a turnpike, which they crossed at grade, and on which
droves of cattle were accustomed to travel. The point of crossing
was approached, by cars going south, through a thorough cut and
curve. For some half a mile before coming to the cut, the turnpike
is in full view of persons on a train of cars; the plaintiff's cattle
were stretched along that part of the turnpike, and were, there-
fore, visible by the engineer. Duties grow out of circumstances.
And in view of these circumstances, we have no hesitation in
declaring that it was the duty of the engineer to observe the cattle
on the turnpike, and to presume that the head of the drove might
be at the crossing, or so near thereto as to make it prudent to mode-
rate the rate of his speed in such degree as to give him entire con-
trol of the engine. It is said the engineer did not see the cattle,
and could not look because he had to keep his eye on the track.
But that was because he was going too fast. Dashing forward with
such Jehu speed as to be unable to see a drove of cattle half a mile
long, was a very rash mode of approaching the crossing of a great
public thoroughfare, which must be approached, as he very well
knew, on a curve, and after issuing from a cut, that would more or
less obstruct his view.
Without laying down any general rule as to the manner in which
that crossing or similar ones should be approached, the engineer
was bound, in the circumstances of this case, to approach it at a
perfectly manageable rate of speed, and what he was bound to do
the plaintiff had a right to presume would be done. And the mea-
sures of the precaution taken or omitted by the plaintiff cannot be
properly estimated without allowing him full benefit of this pre-
sumption.
Such is the rule on common highways, as well as in river and
ocean navigation. Each driver presumes every other he meets will
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keep to the right, and takes his own measures accordingly. And
so with sailing vessels. If both vessels have the -wind free or abeam,
they must both keep to the right. Each must calculate on this
course being taken by the other. To avoid collision, each must act
according to rule and must presume that the other will do likewise.
Lockwood vs. Lashell, 7 Harris, 346.
Such being the relative positions, rights and duties of the parties,
the court, after stating the general principles of law applicable to
actions of this sort, proceeded to explain the duties of the plaintiff,
that he was bound to the more care from the close proximity of the
railroad, to subject himself to some inconvenience and delay rather
than incur the hazard of a collision, and that if he assumed the
responsibility of crossing the railroad after being advised that the
cars would be there in a few minutes, he cannot complain when the
disaster comes, that if he could have stopped his drove without great
inconvenience, he should have done so, and if not, that it would
have been a reasonable and proper precaution to have sent a signal
along the track of the railroad, so as to have notified the engineer
of the danger ; that the liability of the cattle to be frightened by
the whistle, was a contingency which the plaintiff should have taken
into consideration, and assuming that the engineer saw the cattle,
it was referred to the jury to say whether it was more reasonable
in him to suppose that those in charge had taken the proper pre
caution, than it was for them to attempt to pass the drove over
the railroad, under the circumstances.
In regard to the conduct of the defendants' servants, the learned
judge said he was inclined to the opinion that a crossing of this
character should not be approached at a speed of twenty-five or
thirty miles an hour; that prudence and a proper regard for life and
property would demand that the speed should be considerably
abated.
The question of negligence in either or both parties was left to
the jury, with the remark: "We do not undertake to say that this
or that line of conduct amounts to negligence, but only to present
for your consideration our view of what, under the circumstances,
would be reasonable and proper."
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The charge undoubtedly led to the conclusion, that there was
culpable negligence on both sides; on the part of the company in
not abating the speed of the train, and on the part of tbe plaintiff
in not stopping the drove short of the crossing, in not sending a
signal back along the road, and in not anticipating the effect of the
whistle on the herd.
Yet while this was the obvious tendency of the charge, culpable
negligence was no where defined in it, either abstractly or concretely
or in view of the evidence; but the jury were told very emphati-
cally, as here quoted, that the court would not declare that this or
that line of conduct amounted to negligence. The amount of it was,
that the whole case was referred to the jury to form their own notions
of the negligence, and to find whether it attached to both parties,
with very explicit instructions that the plaintiff could recover only
for an injury resulting wholly from the negligence of the defendants.
This was a very inadequate presentation of the case; inadequate
chiefly, in that it conveyed to the jury no comprehensive view of the
respective rights and duties of the parties, and no just conception of
the legal ideas of negligence as growing out of those rights and
duties. It is usual, in the trial of such cases, to adapt the legal
definition of negligence to such views of the facts in evidence as a
jury may reasonably be expected to do, and then to refer the evidence
to them to say where and to whom the negligence attaches. The
chief fault of this charge is that it did not so present the case, but
for this omission, though a most material one, we cannot consistently
with the habits of this court, reverse the judgment. Not for saying,
what it was quite neccessary to say, that the general principles of
law were to be interpreted in their applicationto such cases. They
are sufficiently vigorous when properly applied, without any addi-
tional force or extra heat imparted to them. Yet an exceptionable
observation of this sort is not sufficient ground for reversal.
There are, however, matters in the charge which we think were cal-
culated to mislead the jury. From the course of observation in respect
to the conduct of the plaintiff, the jury might well infer that he was
bound to anticipate and provide against the high rate of speed with
which the train approached the crossing. Nothing could be more
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erroneous. If that rate of speed was, under all circumstances,
imprudent and unreasonable, the plaintiff was not only not bound to
anticipate it, but he had no right to presume that the company
would violate their rule of duty. To avoid collision he was bound
to do all that prudent men in general would do in his situation, and
he was entitled and bound to presume that the company would do
likewise. The question for the jury was, whether the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence in these, the necessary and legal conditions of
the case, not whether he was guilty of negligenee for failing to guard
against illegal and unauthorized conduct of the defendants, such as
the learned judge seemed to think might be fairly imputed to them.
Another manifest error was in leading the jury to hold the plain-
tiff bound to send a signal along the road. There was no such duty
on the plaintiff. He could neither control the employee of the
company who was at work near the crossing, nor had he himself any
right to be upon the track, except for the single purpose of passing
along the turnpike. Railroad tracks and trains are committed by
law to the exclusive custody of incorporated companies, and their
accredited agents and servants. Strangers are not to intermeddle
therewith. The law insists upon a clear track, and then it holds
the company to a safe transportation. The right and the duty are
reciprocal and correlative, and both are to be enforced with stern
exactitude. If every volunteer may go along the track to give such
signals as he thinks proper, confusion and disaster would be the
frequent consequence, and there would be an end of the wholesome
responsibility which the interest of society has, to hold railroad
companies. They are bound to employ all necessary agents, to in-
struct them properly in their duties, and to look to them for the
performance of every act which the business of the road requires.
If this occasions required signals, it was the business of the company's
agent, who was at hand, to give them, and it was a mistake in the
court to think the plaintiff in fault, for not giving them.
When we speak of the imperative necessity for a clear track, we
mean to except of course crossings of public highways, at grade, for,
at such points, travelers have a right to be within the rails long
enough to effect a passage across them, and in the case of this com-
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pany the legislature have reversed the rule, and forbidden the com-
pany to obstruct the travelers' highway. Still, even at such places,
the traveler has the obligations of prudence upon him. He is bound
to stop and look out for trains, and may not rush heedlessly, nor
remain unnecessarily on a spot over which the law allows engines of
fearful power to be propelled by one of the most resistless agents of
nature. Those who use both intersecting highways are bound to
a reasonable measure of diligence, and where both practiceit, collisions
are impossible, else the law would not allow both highways to exist-
One or the other would be abated as a common nuisance if they
could not co-exist without painful consequences which follow from
collisions. The fact of collisions, therefore always proves culpable
negligence in somebody, and under proper instructions, the jury
are to ascertain in this case who is responsible for it.
If it be found to belong to both parties, the court were right in
saying the plaintiff could not recover. The rule is so held is this
court, and generally in the American courts. The case of Beers
vs. The Hfousatonic B. B. Co., 2 Am. Railway cases, 114, (a case
very like the present in many of its features) and in some of the
:English cases therein cited, are perhaps exceptions. The ruling
there was that if the plaintiff could not by the exercise of ordinary
care have avoided the injury, the want of such care on his part would
not preclude him from a recovery, such a mode of stating the rule
involves the solution of a most difficult problem, for who is to say
that an injury resulting from the actual want of ordinary care on
the part of two parties engaged in different occupations at the same
time and place, would certainly have resulted from the want of
ordinary care of only one of these parties.
I prefer our own mode of holding the law, that if the injury result
from the want of ordinary care of both parties, neither has a remedy
against the other, but if it be not in any degree ascribable to the
negligence of one party, due regard being had to all the circumstances
of his position, he may have redress from the other.
With the principles in view that have been thus indicated, this
case must go to another jury.
The judgment is reversed, and a venirefacias de novo awarded.
572 WINTER vs. INSURANCE COMPANY.
in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May, 1858.
WINTER ET AL. VS. DELAWARE INSURANCE COMPANY
1
Where a ship sailed from Baltimore bound for Portland, Oregon, and was compelled
to put into Rio to refit, and after being refitted, sailed for San Francisco, but
was again compelled to return to Rio, a bottomry bond executed at Rio, having
been made payable at San Francisco: Held, no abandonment of the voyage to
Portland, San Francisco being on the route to the place of final destination.
Charles Ingersoll, for plaintiffs.
George Xf. Wharton and J. Hill Martin, for defendants.
An action in covenant on a marine policy of insurance, in the
matter of the Schooner Orb.
Insurance on vessel, $2,500; valued at $5,500.
Insurance on cargo, $5,000; valued at $17,000.
PLAInTIFF'S CLAIM.
First Disaster-Particular average on vessel,' - - $1,030 77
General average on vessel, - - 19 05
General-average on cargo, - - 102 96
- _ $1,152 78
Second Disaster-Salvage loss, vessel, - - - $1,616 09
Salvage loss, cargo, - - - 3,617 39
$5,233 48
$6,386 26
This was an action on a policy of insurance issued by the Dela-
ware Mutual Safety Insurance Co., May 7, 1851, to Winter, Lati-
mer & Co., of Baltimore, insuring for them the Schooner Orb, in
$2,500, valued at $5,500, and on cargo $5,000, valued at $17,000,
on a voyage from Baltimore to Portland, Oregon.
The vessel sailed May 1, 1851, on her destined voyage, and having
encountered heavy seas and tempestuous weather, and becoming
leaky, put into Rio, July 8, 1851, where the master, as agent of
the owners, placed the vessel and cargo in the hands of Maxwell,
Wright & Co., merchants of that city, and made the usual protest.
July 10, a survey was held on the vessel and repairs ordered, after
1 Reported by J. Hill Martin, Esq.-Eds. Am. L. Beg.
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which a second survey was held, and a report made in favor of the
repairs ; and afterwards a third survey, approving of the repairs,
and reporting the vessel in a seaworthy condition, fit to continue
the voyage. As the master had no means to pay for the repairs at
Rio, Maxwell, Wright & Co. made the necessary advances upon a
bottomry bond on the vessel and cargo for $3,272 14, at 56 per
cent. maritime interest, to be paid when the vessel should arrive at
the Port of San Francisco, and be safely moored for forty-eight
hours, when it became due, and payment could be enforced. This
being the only way in which the master could make the necessary
repairs to his vessel, and the only terms on which he could raise
the money, that is, on a bond on vessel and cargo, payable at San
Francisco. The vessel sailed on the:lst August, 1851, and on the
11-h of September, when off Cape Horn, she encountered tempes-
tuous weather, and a series of heavy storms, it being then mid-
winter in those latitudes, which damaged the vessel so greatly, that
on consultation, the master concluded to make a port on theAtlan-
tic coast, and after much difficulty, and obtaining assistance from
the Whaler Eugenia, he was enabled to reach again the Port of
Rio, 15th October, 1851, in a very bad condition; and again con
signed his vessel and cargo to Maxwell, Wright & Co. The master
made protest and called a survey on vessel and cargo; second sur-
vey recommended a sale of the schooner. A survey being held on
the cargo, it was recommended to be sold for the benefit of all con-
cerned, "being generally so badly damaged as to render it unfit
for reshipment, and could not be forwarded to its port of destina-
tion."
The case was tried at Nisi Prius in December, 1857, before Mr.
Justice THOmPSON and a jury.
On the trial, the defendants admitted that they were liable for
their proportion of the partial loss on vessel, and general average
on vessel and cargo, arising from the first disaster, and requested
the judge to charge, among other points:
That if the jury believe the Orb sailed from- Rio de Janeiro,
under a bottomry bond, such as that given in evidence, the defend-
ants are not liable for any loss accruing after such sailing.
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The judge so charged, and the jury rendered a verdict for the
plaintiffs for $1,505 13.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LOWRIE, 0. J.-The jury must have understood, from the charge,
that the fact of sailing from Rio Janeiro for San Francisco, under
the terms of the bottomry bond, was a change of voyage, even
though the intention was to keep on from San Francisco to Port-
land; but intention relative to destination is an essential element
of a voyage, and part of its definition. The bottomry bond was
very convincing evidence of the intention to go to San Francisco;
but it was not conclusive evidence of final destination; even a clear-
ance to that port would not have been. Assuming then, that the
jury would have found the continued intention to go on to Port-
land, we cannot say that the original voyage was in fact abandoned,
even though we should feel obliged to declare that, as matter of
law, it was so far changed as to .discharge the insurers. And this
we cannot do without first deciding that the circumstances of the
voyage do not furnish an adequate excuse for the vessel's setting
out from Rio Janeiro to go by way of San Francisco.
In judging of the adequacy of the excuse, the case admits of a
division of the question, according to the value of the property, in-
sured, the ship and the cargo separately. It was certainly the
duty of the master, under the circumstances, to provide for the
transportation of the merchandise to its destination, by the best
means in his power; and so carried it would still be under the pro-
tection of the insurance. If he could not send it by the direct
route, he would be justified in sending it by another, or in taking
it by another in his own vessel, if he could not get her repaired so
as to go directly. So far, then, as relates to the merchandise, the
accident, and the necessary terms of repairing it, justified the
change of route by San Francisco.
But it does not seem so clear to us, relative to the ship, for if
she was once safe from the perils insured against, and yet not fit,
and could not be fitted to resume the voyage from the port of
safety, she was excused from it. To get repaired then, so as to go
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by another route, in order to carry on the goods, would therefore
seem to place her in the condition of a substitute ship. But we
need and do not decide this, for there is another principle which
retains both ship and cargo under the contract of insurance.
We think that the jury might have found that there had been no
change of the ultimate destination ; and then it would follow very
clearly that the risk continued until the route was actually departed
from; and most likely it would continue even after a determined
change of destination. If a risk never commences, the insured is
entitled to a return of premium, as being paid without considera-
tion. But because of the entry of the contract the court have an
apportioned return of it on account of a part of the voyage hav-
ing been abandoned.
When, therefore, the risk has attached for a given voyage, there
is no principle of justice that requires it to be detached until there
is a change of the hazard. A mere intention or determination to
change the route at a given point does no wrong to the insurer.
He is paid for the whole voyage, and is saved from wrong, if held
liable, only so far as the true route is kept, and discharged when it
is departed from. A knowledge of the destination is necessary for
the definition and interpretation of the contract. Knowing it, we
can mark the route that must be taken under the contract. But it
is not essential to offer to perform the whole voyage, the less of it
the better for the insurer. An insurance to Havre via Southamp-
ton, is not avoided if once attached by the master's determination,
at or after starting, to go no further than Southampton.
Assuming then, that the intention to go to Portland was kept up,
this was only an intended deviation, and the bottomry bond has no
influence on the case, except so far as it makes the proof clear of
an intention to deviate. It no more constitutes an abandonment of
the voyage, than taking in a cargo for San Francisco would have
done. If there was no actual deviation, no condition of the con-
tract was broken.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
